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Given Britain’s desire to maintain its own border controls, it will not join the EU’s passport-free ‘Schengen’ area in the 
foreseeable future. Ireland also has to stay out because it shares a common travel area with the UK. 
But there is now mounting evidence that this situation hurts tourism and businesses in Britain and Ireland. Non-
European travellers can move freely between Schengen countries with a single visa, and many skip the further hassle of 
getting visas to visit Britain or Ireland. Already the Schengen area has an agreement to facilitate Chinese group tourism, 
which is growing fast, and from which the UK and Ireland are excluded. 
This problem could be overcome if Britain, Ireland and the Schengen countries would agree on ‘mutual recognition’ of the 
visas they issue, without the UK or Ireland having to scrap their border controls.  
 
or the present UK government, full 
accession to the Schengen area, a passport-
free travel area covering most of Europe, is 
a red line that it will not cross. Ireland shares a 
common travel area and land border with the UK 
and is also bound by this decision. However, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that the UK, along 
with Ireland, is suffering serious economic and 
reputational costs as a result of its separate visa 
and border management policies. 
Britain and Ireland already participate in parts of 
the Schengen system relating to police 
cooperation. This paper argues that a fuller 
cooperation agreement with Schengen could cut 
the costs of the present system for the two non-
members. The idea would be for Britain and 
Ireland to enter into mutual recognition 
agreements on visa policy with Schengen 
countries, without suppression of their port or 
airport border controls. 
A case of simple economics for Britain 
and Ireland 
For many people, the cost and hassle of obtaining 
visas for business purposes or to go on holiday 
act as a deterrent. One of the achievements of the 
EU internal market, with free movement of 
goods, services, capital and people, is that visitors 
from the rest of the world view the Union as a 
single destination. Asian, Russian and other 
tourists and business persons requiring a visa 
when coming to ‘Europe’ will first of all wish to 
get a Schengen visa. With this one document, 
they have access to 25 countries, representing 
around 86% of the EU’s population and GDP, and 
offering an equivalent share of Europe’s main 
tourist attractions. 
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Table 1. The UK, Ireland and Schengen area compared 
(2010) 
 UK  & 
Ireland 
Schengen 
countries 
Schengen (as a 
multiple of UK 
& Ireland) 
Number of 
Countries 
2 25  12.5 
Population size 
(millions) 
65.1   416.5 6.4 
GDP (€ billion)  1.85   11 5.9 
 
How many of these visitors will also apply for a 
British or Irish visa? And how many of them will 
say: “It is enough hassle to get one visa; to get a 
second one at the same time for adding one-sixth 
more attractions is not worth the trouble. Let’s 
skip it”? 
Schengen started in 1985 with just six countries. 
The UK opted out of the initiative, having much 
less interest in scrapping border controls because 
of its island geography. It is above all the huge 
streams of autobahn traffic across continental 
European frontiers that are the concern of 
individuals and commercial truck drivers. For 
them, time-consuming frontier stops are 
something they really want to do without.  
By contrast, the border controls currently in force 
for Eurostar train passengers, or cross-channel 
ferry travellers are of trivial concern. For 
example, the Eurostar traveller from Brussels 
passes British border controls at the Brussels Midi 
station at the same time and place as the Belgian 
controls and the time-consuming security checks 
take place. Similarly, the driver of a car taking the 
cross-channel ferry has to check in long in 
advance in any case. And with airport security 
checks now so onerous and time-consuming, the 
addition or abolition of passport controls in 
airports is a minor matter. If Britain and Ireland 
retain these passport controls at their ports and 
airports for security reasons, this is no big 
problem for the traveller. Island geography 
makes a real difference.  
However, the requirement for overseas visitors to 
get a second visa is a serious disadvantage. Put 
yourself in the position of the visitor to Europe: 
planning foreign trips is a complicated affair, 
with applications having to be coordinated with 
hotel bookings and flight schedules. Many people 
want flexibility. But to get the visa, the passport 
has to be surrendered for a sometimes uncertain 
number of days, and if one has to get a second 
visa (for the UK) after the first one (for Schengen), 
the hassle is multiplied. So the rationale for the 
would-be tourist becomes obvious: get one visa 
for Schengen and you get six times more value 
than for the UK. 
The tendency for visitors to favour Schengen and 
skip Britain and Ireland is reflected in official 
policies. Consider one example that already is of 
increasing economic significance: in March 2004, 
the European Community, on behalf of the 
Schengen states, made a special agreement with 
the Chinese national tourism agency to facilitate 
group tourism across the Schengen area. Britain 
and Ireland are excluded from this. 
In addition, it costs a tourist more to obtain a 
British visa than it does to obtain a Schengen visa. 
The standard British short-term (3-month) visa 
costs £76 (€87 at the current exchange rate), 
whereas the standard short-term Schengen visa 
costs €60. In addition, Schengen-area countries 
have begun visa facilitation agreements with 
some important countries, for example reducing 
the cost for visas for Russia and other European 
neighbouring countries to €35. For longer-term 
visas, the price differences are even starker, with 
the UK charging £265 for a two-year multi-entry 
visa, £486 for five years and £702 for ten years. 
France charges €99 for long-term visas. As 
regards administrative procedures, the UK 
Border Agency (UKBA) – responsible for issuing 
visas to Britain – has reduced its services in small 
countries. Passports and visa applications have to 
be sent from there to consulates in larger 
neighbours. For example, the British consulate in 
Brussels no longer issues visas, so non-EU 
nationals in Belgium have to have their passports 
sent by courier to Paris and back, which increases 
time delays. The UKBA has also taken steps to 
automate visa procedures, requiring visa 
applicants to fill out long, complex online 
questionnaires before admitting potential tourists 
to a UK consulate for a meeting. 
Actual trends 
The available data on the total number of visas 
issued by the UK and Schengen states seem to 
confirm the implications of these observations. 
While the number of UK visas issued has 
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million per year over the last five years, the 
number of Schengen visas has risen significantly, 
from around 8 to 12 million per year. This 
discrepancy suggests that the UK is missing out 
on the significantly expanding global market for 
tourism and business travel. 
Figure 1. Schengen and UK visas issued:  
Data and trend (2005-09) 
 
International branding of Britain   
The website of the British Foreign Office  gives 
prominence to the following extracts from 
speeches of William Hague, the foreign minister: 
We are a world-class destination for 
international business, we are a global hub for 
creativity and innovation, a centre of the 
world’s financial services industry and a 
leading champion of free trade and economic 
liberalism. 
The aspirations contained in such language is 
laudable. But British visa policy as just described 
undermines the credibility of this image. 
International branding of the state is nowadays 
an important instrument among the many 
elements that make up an economy’s 
attractiveness for trade, investment and tourism, 
and thus of its competitiveness. The world’s 
media are packed with advertisements for 
branding the country as ‘Incredible India’, 
'Surprising Singapore' or 'Malaysia, truly Asia'. 
But the key to successful branding is consistency 
and credibility behind the headlines. Britain’s 
rigid position on standing aloof from the 
Schengen area is an inconsistency that risks 
undermining its global branding effort even to 
the point of being counter-productive.  
The Irish response 
Ireland is locked into a common travel area with 
the UK, partly because of the undesirability of 
physical border checks between the Republic and 
Northern Ireland. The removal of the British 
military from the border region after the Good 
Friday Agreement of 1998 has been an important 
feature of the peace settlement. It is of great 
political significance to both parties that this 
achievement is sustained. This is the main reason 
why Ireland joined with the UK in not acceding 
to the Schengen area. While there are no controls 
at this border, the UK and Ireland are not a 
common visa area, so that the non-EU visitor to 
Northern Ireland who has a UK visa is not legally 
entitled to extend his trip to Dublin, and vice 
versa. He can travel from Belfast to Dublin 
without hindrance, but if caught, he would have 
done something illegal, which most tourists do 
not want to do.  
Ireland judged the economic costs, especially for 
its tourist industry, to have become so significant 
that it decided on 11 May 2011, unilaterally to 
waive the need for an Irish visa for visitors 
holding a UK visa. Presumably, the Irish 
government wanted to act decisively and fast, 
without getting into a bilateral negotiation with 
the UK, which might at best have taken time and 
at worst failed to reach agreement. The 
government in its press release announcing these 
measures stated: “Tourist bodies report that this 
duplication of administrative paperwork (of 
getting two visas) acts as a significant 
disincentive to short stay visitors and for the 
development and marketing of Ireland as an 
‘add-on’ destination.” This visa waiver applies to 
a list of countries including Russia, Ukraine, 
Turkey, the Gulf Arab states, India and China, all 
major sources of potential tourism to Europe. If 
just this ‘UK add-on’ tourist market is significant, 
how much more so would be that of the entire 
Schengen area? The simple arithmetic, following 
Table 1, would suggest seven times more 
important.  
In Switzerland, the need to avoid hurting the 
local tourist industry with a second visa 
requirement for visitors on a wider European trip 
was one of the main arguments for joining 
Schengen.  
What about the differences in the UK 
and Schengen visa lists?  
The lists of countries from which the UK and 
Schengen require a visa are very similar. The 
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territories for which Schengen requires visas. 
However, almost all of the 26 are small islands or 
former colonies of the UK, and this is hardly a 
problem. The Schengen area is visa-free for a few 
states for which the UK requires visas, notably 
three Latin American countries (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador), and closer to home the 
Western Balkan states which are now visa free for 
Schengen but not for the UK (except Croatia). 
There are two possible solutions here: either a) 
harmonise the lists, but this could be a time-
consuming and politically difficult matter, or b) 
more simply, stick to the rule that each party 
recognises each other’s visas. This would mean 
that nationals of the many small island territories 
that are visa-free for the UK would still have to 
get a visa to visit the Schengen area. However, 
their number is likely to be small. If there is no 
political will to move to harmonisation, then the 
latter seems the best solution.  
The UK’s refusal to extend the same visa-free 
advantages to the Western Balkan countries as 
the Schengen signatories can be criticised on 
grounds that the UK is taking a free ride at the 
expense of the rest of the EU: the UK is as keen as 
any member state to foster the Europeanisation of 
the Balkans, and visa-free travel is a major 
instrument to this end, but here the UK lets the 
rest of the EU do all the heavy lifting. Italy, 
Slovenia and Austria are, in any case, on the front 
line for unauthorised immigration and 
criminality from the Balkans. As a foreign and 
security policy matter, the UK is as ardent as any 
other member-state in wanting to see the final 
‘Europeanisation’ of these post-Yugoslav states, 
for which freedom of movement with the EU is 
one of the most significant instruments of 
influence. But the UK is ducking a key 
responsibility here.   
The UK and Ireland’s partial 
participation in Schengen 
The UK and Ireland have since 2000 been taking 
part in some provisions of the Schengen system. 
A decision by the EU sets this out in legal detail, 
identifying the relevant articles in the Schengen 
Convention of 1985. Readers of this decision will 
have considerable difficulty in understanding 
what the dense set of numbered cross–references 
with the Schengen Convention actually mean. EU 
officials clarify that the decision admits the UK to 
a set of provisions relating to cooperation over 
criminal matters, and includes partial access to 
the Schengen Information System (SIS). The SIS is 
a huge database of third country nationals for 
whom there has been some reason to record their 
identity, and for whom a Schengen state has 
issued an ‘alert’. These alerts may concern either 
criminal matters or non-criminal matters relating 
to  a visa application. The UK and Ireland have 
access to the SIS on criminal matters, but not on 
visa matters. They can consult these SIS entries 
where criminal matters are involved, but they 
cannot enter data on individuals from their own 
data bases. 
This partial participation in Schengen is thus 
quite limited, but provides a basis upon which a 
fuller cooperation might be devised without 
necessitating full participation.    
Security concerns 
What risks, if any, would a mutual recognition 
agreement between the UK and Ireland and the 
Schengen area pose with regard to illegal 
immigration, terrorism and cross-border crime? Is 
the Schengen visa system leaky or lax, at least at 
the weakest points in the system?  
Illegal immigrants are not Schengen visa holders, 
unless they obtain one legally and then overstay 
the time limit. They are by definition people who 
enter the EU illegally, either by boat across the 
Mediterranean, or crossing the land border 
between Greece and Turkey. The UK and Ireland 
would retain the power to deny entry to such 
people (including those with invalid visas due to 
overstay), who might make their way through 
Europe to the Channel ports or try to enter by air. 
A i r l i n e s  h a v e  i n  a n y  c a s e  t h e  d u t y  t o  c h e c k  o n  
visas before admitting passengers. As regards 
criminals, there is already UK and Irish 
participation in Schengen, as just described. 
We have interviewed officials from non-EU 
members of the Schengen area about their 
experience. Norway and Switzerland are two 
countries with the highest standards of public 
administration. Have they experienced problems 
from receiving Schengen-visa visitors who in 
their judgement should not have been granted 
visas? The answer was the same in both cases: 
there have been some individual cases, but it is 
not a major problem, or one that has become a 
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What about asylum-seekers who enter with a 
Schengen visa and then request asylum? Most 
asylum-seekers do not apply for visas, of course. 
But if a visa holder entered the UK from 
continental Europe and sought asylum, he would 
be returned to the country of first entry in the 
Schengen area (the standard EU procedure for the 
hearing of asylum claims, according to the Dublin 
Convention of 1990, revised in 2003).   
Our reading of these factors is therefore that the 
security risks for the UK and Ireland inherent in 
entering into a visa mutual recognition agreement 
with Schengen are minimal. 
The crises in the Arab world have led to the 
increasing number of boat people reaching Italy 
in particular. France reacted by partially 
reintroducing border controls and EU leaders 
demanded that the Commission draft new rules 
allowing for emergency reintroduction of border 
controls in the Schengen area. These steps have 
no direct implications on the idea of mutual 
recognition of visas between Britain and the 
Schengen area. If anything, they bring the two 
into more convergent positions. The UK wants to 
keep control of its borders, which our proposal 
supports. The Schengen countries may for their 
part agree to the definition of exceptional 
circumstances for border controls.  
Conclusions and recommendation 
The damage being done by the UK’s present visa 
policies to its self-branding as ‘world-class 
destination’ or ‘global hub’ seems substantial. 
Relative to Schengen, the UK seems to be losing 
out in the growing international tourism and 
travel market. 
The UK and Ireland should together submit a 
request to make mutual recognition agreements 
with the Schengen members for each other’s 
short-term visas. Mutual recognition is a well-
tried mechanism in EU internal market law and 
policy. The UK and Ireland would retain port and 
airport border controls as now, just as Schengen 
countries would retain border controls from 
travellers coming from these two countries. 
The differences in visa exemption lists should not 
impede this arrangement. Someone from a visa-
exempt country of one party, wishing to travel 
from there to a country requiring a visa, would 
still have to get a visa. Differences in visa costs 
should be eliminated, with the UK and Ireland to 
align on Schengen charges for ordinary as well as 
‘facilitated’ visas.  
In May 2011, Ireland unilaterally decided to 
recognise UK visas out of concern for its tourism 
sector: this is a partial example of the far more 
important action that is here recommended to 
both the UK and Ireland in relation to Schengen. 
Similar action for long-term visas could also be 
considered, but it would not be the priority for 
the purpose of minimising economic losses, 
although the UK’s fees for long-term visas are 
extraordinarily high.    
The security risks from this move would seem to 
be slight, given that illegal immigrants do not 
enter the Schengen area with valid visas. 
Moreover, the UK and Ireland participate in any 
event, in Schengen cooperation on matters of 
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